Showing posts with label Short. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Short. Show all posts

Thursday, October 14, 2010

SFLY: A Value Investment? Not In My Book

In last week's edition of Value Investor Insight, the newsletter featured a bullish piece on Shutterfly, Inc. from investor Mario Cibelli of Marathon Partners.  Cibelli made a compelling case for NFLX in a 2006 edition of VII when everyone else said that the DVD-by-mail model could never compete in an industry that would quickly move to streaming movies and put the company in direct competition with AMZN, Blockbuster and others.  He saw NFLX as a "disruptive" business with a competitive advantage that would succeed.  He was correct, and as you may know, shares of NFLX have soared to around $150 as of writing this article.

Cibelli sees SFLY as his next big "disruptive" bet in an industry that "is in the early stages of significant growth...[in which] it is Shutterfly's business to lose..."  Cibelli believes that SFLY has been "the most aggressive innovator" in the space based on their moves from low margin 4x6 prints to higher margin photo books and the "Simple Path" method of uploading pictures to photo books that takes a fraction of the time it takes to create an entire custom book.  He also believes that as times goes on, if SFLY is able to maintain their "30% share of the [photo printing] business - the company would more than double revenues" based on what US consumers spend annually on greeting cards, photos and photo books.

However, Cibelli's argument fails to make take into account some very important aspects of the business that not only don't make it a value investment, but at these levels, I believe it to be a decent short candidate.
1. SFLY makes what is essentially a commodity product on the internet with paper thin margins;
2. Their "innovations" have been and can continue to be copied by competitors (both existing and new) that are constantly engaged in pricing and promotional wars with each other;
3. The Company produces minimal to no cash flow outside Q4 (holiday season);
4. Primarily has machines that don't run 3/4 of the year (w/ the exception of small commercial printing biz);
5. Trades at a current 110x earnings and 50x next year's earnings (admittedly SFLY has high depreciation expense, but almost equally high CapEx, so cash flow is only marginally positive from an accounting perspective);
6.  Analyst projections are far too high.

Commoditized Product
While I believe that SFLY offers a quality product and has thousands of satisfied customers, every one of their existing products as well as recent "innovations" on their site are easily copied.  This is the most important part of the SFLY short story in my mind; if there is no competitive moat, how can an investor expect historical growth to continue AND how will they grow margins?  If they can't do this, why pay a premium multiple for the shares?

For a starting example, look at a site such as picasa.com (popular google service for online photo sharing).  Shutterfly is undifferentiated from the other listed printing options, leaving price as the only differentiating factor in this equation if you are not already an SFLY customer.  Additionally, there are OVER 100 similar online photo printing sites like those below:



















When asked what differentiated their products from the competition, SFLY management told me that their product has a better feel - the fact that the pictures (or photo books) come in a higher quality, heavier duty box when delivered.  Prodded further, the stated that site innovations (such as "Simple Path") have also differentiated them from their competition.  While I respect the fact that SFLY tries to differentiate with a higher quality product, they don't hold patents in their photo processing, their delivery method nor their other services and as a result, have seen margins on 4x6 printing erode significantly.  There have been constant price wars in the 4x6 print space, with competitors undercutting SFLY's price.  Here's a good synopsis of developments in the 4x6 price war that has ensued over the last several years.  With prints as low as 5c/print, there's not a lot of room for margin...add in free shipping to that (as advertised above by American Greetings) and you're practically giving them away...it should be noted that in 2009, shipping accounted for 14% of SFLY's revenue.  Continued attempts to undercut shipping costs are a further threat to SFLY.

As innovators, SFLY has attempted to find a growth engine beyond the low margin 4x6 business by introducing the personalized photo book as a way to store memories in a more customized, lasting manner.  Over the last several years, custom products like photo books, greeting cards and  calendars have become increasingly important to SFLY as seen in the revenue breakdown below:






However, there is also nothing to keep competitors out of the photo book and customized space either and SFLY runs a high risk of these albums becoming yet another commodity product.  You can see HERE that there are already several competitors in the space at a lower price point than SFLY, including Snapfish (HP), the main driver behind the 4x6 price wars that eroded margins to where they are today (here, here and here are some direct examples of the competition, congrats if you can spot the differences...).  As these personalized products are brought down in price by competition, SFLY's margins on these products will erode just as they did in the 4x6 prints.

Although only anecdotal in nature, SFLY is offering non-holiday related 20% discounts on ALL photo books right now.  As of two weeks ago, this deal was supposed to end Sept. 29, but has been extended through October 13.   According to Morgan Keegen, which covers SFLY, photo book pricing has been decreasing steadily over the past several weeks.  While this may be a positive in bringing new customers, it's still a negative when it comes to margins.

Speaking of margins, they're paper thin.   While they have increased markedly over the last two years since the economy began sinking, gross margin, EBITDA, EBIT and net margins are all flat to down significantly since 2004, a result of continually squeezed margins of a commodity product.  While SFLY's 5 year Revenue CAGR as of YE2009 was over 35%, EPS had grown at barely half that rate. Cibelli says in the article that he "honestly believes this is a $1 billion revenue business" and "at that revenue level, his price target for the shares goes to $100."  Let's do the math with max margins from 2004 as well as current margins and see where that business would trade:















At current margins, SFLY is certainly no value.  If the company can somehow keep out the competition, which has only grown more numerous over the years, innovate and grow all margins by 50-200%, there is a chance that shares could be reasonably priced on an EV/EBITDA basis, but still expensive on earnings to be called "value".  At today's margins, Ben Graham would spin in his grave and Warren Buffett would have a cardiac episode if you tried to pitch this as a "value" name.

4th Quarter or Bust
SFLY has negative EPS and earns almost no cashflow outside of their fiscal 4th quarter, where revenues triple from the other quarters and positive EPS covers the losses of the previous 4 quarters in order to make SFLY have a positive P/E.  It also produces enough cash flow to cover the other quarters and make SFLY trade at a high, but not ghastly 17.5x FY09 FCF (For simplicity sake, I'm using a calc of CFO-CapEx).

While this in itself is not a huge problem, it means the 4th quarter is very important to the business and any sort of hiccup is problematic.  On the 2Q conference call, CFO Mark Rubash described "moderation in activity" in late 2Q and into early 3Q.  While the site's traffic appears to have picked back up somewhat (according to compete.com), current non-holiday related discounts being offered on their highest margin products do not bode well for a strong 3Q and given current consumer confidence, this also may not be the merriest of holiday seasons either.  According to management (and common sense), SFLY's performance is highly correlated to consumer sentiment and confidence, which has been wanning over the last several months.

To solve some of their fixed cost issues, SFLY has begun a fledgling commercial printing business, although management has admitted it is taking longer to get off the ground than expected.  While they think the business can do $30-40MM in sales, the sales would be lower margin than the core picture printing business.  SFLY only has a few sales people devoted to this effort, which will likely keep revenue growth slow; slim margins due to fixed costs will likely remain in this business line for the foreseeable future.

Valuation and Expectations Too High
Currently trading at around 110x current year expected earnings, SFLY is expensive on an earnings basis...even next year's consensus earnings puts them at a P/E of 47.  Given the company's high depreciation asset base, high P/E will continue to be an issue for SFLY.  Although not unreasonable on an EV/EBITDA basis at around 14.5x, it's still not exactly a "value" discount.  Additionally, growth has been continually slowing over the past several years as both two year and three year CAGR in revenue, gross profit, EBITDA and net income have declined since the company went public.


In addition to an already expensive valuation, analyst estimates are far too high based on historical performance as well as what will ultimately remain a highly competitive market for online photo printing.  Although covered by several major houses (JPM, MS, Lazard, etc.), many analysts only put out one report each quarter at earnings time, so SFLY is generally neglected by the analyst community.   As a result, sell-side estimates contemplate top line growth that may (emphasis on "may) be attainable, but margins that unlikely based on how business has trended over the last 5 years.   Below are street consensus estimates for the next 5 years:











In order to meet these estimates, there is going to have to be both substantial growth in order prices as well as growth in household penetration.  To give you a macro picture of what this would look like, assume that SFLY has 33% mkt share (last number I've heard from Company) and an average order price that grew 8% (average of '07-'09) over 2009 (and continues to grow at this level), this would mean that based on growth expectations of total US households, one in every 4 to 5 houses would need to be placing a photo order per year and for SFLY, these orders and the prices would need to be growing at a steady clip as well.









While this level of growth may not seem overly taxing for SFLY, consider that the competition is fierce for these dollars, household penetration would need to grow almost 40%, keeping other things constant and one in every 10 households would need to make an "average" price order from SFLY.  Then consider that their core customer base is women, age 25-45 with $95K household income.  Unless they can broadly expand the demographic base of their highly discretionary and pricey item or get their core demographic to really up their order values per year, it's going to be tough to meet these estimates.

Risks to Short Idea
SFLY has a pristine balance sheet with $5.83 in cash and no debt, which serves as a support to the shares.  Under circumstances with a business I felt more attraction to from a valuation and competitive moat perspective, I would be lauding their balance sheet, but with a "growing" tech company such as SFLY, it is doubtful this cash would ever be put back into shareholder's hands as dividends or share buybacks...in fact, shares outstanding have been steadily increasing since the company went public due to their egregiously large SBC plan.  At best, they keep the cash, at worst, they make a "strategic" acquisition.

SFLY's market cap makes it vulnerable to be bought out by a competitor (like Snapfish).  I highly doubt the company would be a target for either private equity or management led buyout due to their lumpy earnings and cash flow that is almost wholly dependent on one quarter of operations.  I also doubt that a PE firm could get comfortable with the competitive "advantages" that SFLY claims to have.

For all the reasons above, I believe that not only is SFLY not a true value, but I am short the shares at these levels with expectations that analyst estimates are going to be tough to beat going forward.  While Cibelli may have knocked it out of the park with his call on NFLX, what made that business "disruptive" is that they did something nobody else had ever done - create a profitable subscription based DVD service that ended up not being threatened as quickly as expected by existing titans of the rental and online business.  SFLY is different in that they are doing something that 100 other competitors are doing right now and in a manner that can only be differentiated for a short period of time before competitors cross the moat.  Imagine if there were 100 other DVD subscription services out there right now...the competition would be fierce, price wars would be commonplace and you certainly wouldn't pay the 60x earnings attached to NFLX these days...now imagine paying 100x earnings for that business; that is SFLY.

Disclosure: Short SFLY

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Molycorp: Overpriced on Rare Earth Excitement

Molycorp, Inc. is a company based just south of Denver, CO engaged in the exploration of production of Rare Earth Oxides ("REO").  For the purposes of this article, I will assume you either know what REO(s) are or if not, see here for a fulsome explanation by the Company.

The Company went public in late July in a broken IPO in which the price had to be chopped from the originally marketed $15-17 range to $14/share ($394MM) based on lack of interest in the offering.  Since the IPO, shares are up over 100% to ~$29 as of writing this article, or a market cap of ~$2.4Bn dollars.  The proceeds of the offering will be used to to refurbish equipment and facilities in it's open pit mine in Mountain Pass, CA - the company's only mine.  Mountain Pass was formerly a property of Molybdenum Corp. of America, which was purchased by Union Oil of CA, which was subsequently purchased by Chevron in 2005.  Operations at Mountain Pass were suspended in 2002 due to softening prices in REO and a lack of additional tailings disposal (waste from the production process).  The mine was formerly the largest producer of rare earth minerals in the world before operations were suspended and now still has large deposits of the minerals, although MCP will not be fully operational to mine them until at least late 2011/early 2012.  You may ask then, what are they doing in the mean time to warrant a multi-billion dollar valuation such as this?  Well, quite a bit, but with still over a year of work in front of them before the market can really discover if they warrant this valuation, it's hard to justify a long at these levels and for the reasons below, I would propose a short of MCP.  

First, valuation is getting lofty based on the mine assessment done by SKM (which can be seen on pages 72-76 of their S-1).  By looking at the proven and probable reserves that could be pulled out over the life of the mine, assessing costs and pricing assumptions, SKM came to a net present value of $2.02Bn for the mine, or approximately 20% below the current market valuation of MCP.  Prices for rare earths have run up further since this assessment was priced on June 15, but at the current market cap, one would need to assume that MCP could a) fully extract the proven reserves to meet that NAV and b) that no other REO capacity was to come on line and cut pricing back to a more normalized level.

Second, the market does not seem to be assessing the risk of the operation currently.  While the government has made it clear these rare earth metals are extremely important to national defense and I believe will do all in their power to get this mine running again, there is still a lot to be done in front of operations beginning again.  This is basically a greenfield project that is being provided a brownfield base on which to start.  

Third, they are spending (A LOT) to refurbish the aged, rusted and unusable equipment currently at Mountain Pass.  They are also buying new equipment and in the process of building a plant on-site to produce chemicals (used in production process) and a co-generation facility to provide natural gas power to the operations.  The Company has said they will need in the range of $500-600MM to bring the facilities on-line, which is likely a conservative estimate given they expect to only spend $53MM of that in 2010.  There are also numerous environmental costs before production can begin as well as ongoing after operations commence.  The Company plans to spend $187MM alone on environmental-driven capital projects between now and 2012.    

Fourth, they are not earning any material revenue.  MCP is currently only earning revenue by selling remaining stockpiles of rare earth that they have at the Mountain Pass mine, although they are generating a minuscule amount in comparison to their market cap -  $14MM since inception in June 2008.  They currently have a two customer concentration of 89% of revenues for the six months ended 6/30/10 and generate 90% of sales from two products: lanthanum concentrate and lanthanum oxide.  MCP is also burning through cash, not at an alarming rate currently, but they have only begun to refurb their operations, which will greatly accelerate the cash going out the door.

While the share price run up since the IPO has been due partially to the market's realization of the value of the FUTURE OPERATIONS of the mine, primarily I believe the move is based on a large retail presence (and here) in the name, spurned on by the constant front page headlines regarding China's not-so-generous trading of their rare earth resources (of which, they have about a 97% market share on all rare earths currently produced). If you are not convinced of this being any sort of retail led run up, type "china rare earth" into Google and see the number of articles that have been written on the subject in the last two weeks.  You could also watch the erratic nature in which the stock trades, many times taking 4-6% round trips more than once a day and a 40% round trip last week (down 20% Monday to mid-Wednesday and returning to almost flat by Friday).   We will see for the first time in this quarter's 13-F filings if there are many hedge funds in the name, although I don't suspect that will be the case.

The issue the bulls make here is that rare earth elements are very important to a number of industries including green tech, mobile telephony and defense.  The Mountain Pass mine is currently a front runner in meaningful production outside of China given its history as a producing mine and the remaining resources available there.  The US government wants to see this mine begin operating and will do what it can to make that happen, including a $280 million loan guarantee which has not yet been provided, but will likely go in their favor.  When this mine gets up and running and if Molycorp proves it can be one of the lowest cost operators in the industry and in fact extract the proven reserves in Mountain Pass, there can be a case made that their current valuation is not even excessive and according to their margins may be downright cheap as seen below:






















But until that can happen, I see a lot of mines in the field before MCP finds the clear path to the finish line.  Becoming fully operational is clearly the biggest and first hurdle.  Past that, demand and pricing needs to stay high to realize the revenue and profits to justify their valuation and finally, competition outside of China needs to stay low.  The final point is going to be tough given that "rare" earths are not actually as rare as the name would lead you to believe and based on the economics of the situation, others are beginning to get wise (and here).  Japan has even found a solution of recycling the rare earths out of electronic goods and other items.

The bottom line is that while MCP will likely eventually be a fully operational rare earths producer, the market is not currently pricing in the risk that goes along with what is essentially a greenfield mining project and the hype around the company and it's products is at a fever pitch right now.  While the momentum trade may continue to take MCP a little higher from here, there is a lot of risk to the downside if you get caught up in the hype.  We may look back in 2 years and realize that adding "rare earths" to a company's mining credentials was like adding a ".com" to a company in 1999.  The result for shareholders could be the same as well.

Disclosure: Author is short MCP