Friday, September 17, 2010

OPEN: Update On Daily Deals

As a follow up to my previous article on Travelzoo (TZOO) from Monday, Sept. 13 (which is up +25% as of writing), I put together some recent deal data for OpenTable that I think is pretty interesting.  Getting a little more detailed on the deal services each company offers, Travelzoo has a much more erratic timing on their deals, they may last 3 days or 1 week according to whatever hurdle they are trying to clear on sales, which is unclear and the Company is notoriously hard to reach (I even spoke to one of the few analysts that cover them and he said he communicates mainly via e-mail with IR).  TZOO deals tend also to be lower end ($10 of cupcakes on TZOO vs. $25 off at Gordon Ramsey restaurant on OPEN).  Thus far, OpenTable has had a more stable one deal a week schedule that tends to be at higher end restaurants and all have sold very well.  See below:


During the first week of launch in a new city, activity tends to be very strong, which has been no different in D.C. this week, where OPEN sold 1,992 deals in the first week.  What is most encouraging in their data vs. TZOO is how many deals they are selling and the consistent price point.  TZOO, while having done daily/weekly deals since mid-July, has managed to sell approximately 12,000 deals at prices from $10 to $99, while OPEN, having just launched it's first deals in NYC and Boston in early August, has managed to sell well over 26,000 deals at an average price of ~$25, netting them almost $700K gross additional revenue in a month and a half, in only 7 cities.  The reason I have harped on this again after only one week is that they have only launched in 7 large markets (netting an annualized gross revenue of ~$5.4), while there are probably an additional 20 or more markets that could easily bring in these number of deals each week if they can maintain the quality of restaurants and another 30 in smaller markets that could bring in 1/3 as many deals.  

While you may look at this as a skeptic and say the market is crowded and there are 200 daily deal guys out there offering a similar service/product, I would retort that there are not many that are peddling the high-end like OPEN and there aren't any that have the same diner brand recognition, restaurant relationships and distribution that OPEN does in this particular space.  If you're still skeptical and you think the fad will go away, ask yourself: if you got a 50% off deal one week for a favorite restaurant nearby, then the next week you got a similar offer from another restaurant you really like, would you pass on the second one and say, 'nah, I already saved money last week, no reason to do it again'.  Of course not...recession or not, people like to save money and you'd buy a deal every week if you were presented with quality, desirable restaurants and that's what I believe OPEN aims to do.

Since I published this piece originally on Friday afternoon to my Blog, Barron's came out with a full story over the weekend regarding the rich price of OpenTable shares.  The piece makes several good points that have been harped on by every short seller or naysayer on the stock, mainly that it's expected growth (or lack thereof) does not justify it's high multiple.  Barron's says, "it's valuation, at 110x this year's estimated earnings of 59 cents a share, and 75 times next year's forecast of 87 cents, could lead to sever indigestion."  While I don't disagree that it may be time to take some profits off the table if you own and probably not the best time to get in if you do not, the article neglects to properly highlight the basis for the recent moves in the shares - the Spotlight deals.  With only one brief mention towards the end of the piece, Barron's doesn't seem to grasp the growth potential of this new revenue source.  

I'll leave the conversations of valuation to another forum (expensive for my blood given the recent run up), but keep in mind that if they can earn $5.4MM gross revenue on 7 cities, what happens when that is 25 cities or 50 cities?  Below is a conservative snapshot of the impact of daily deals for this year (2 cities, ramping to 14) and 2011 at only 25 cities.

Disclosure: Small Long position in TZOO, no position in OPEN

Sunday, September 12, 2010

HAWK: Former Value Trap Becoming an Actual Value

Seahawk Drilling has been an "on the radar" stock for me for several months as shares have been plummeting from a high of around $35 in September 2009 to a low of under $7 in late August.  For a quick background, Seahawk was spun out of Pride International in 2009 and operates 20 jackup rigs in the Gulf of Mexico (of which 4 are currently working, 1 has a permit pending, 1 is cold stacked/in repairs and contracted for the remainder this year, 3 are actively available and 11 are cold stacked).  These rigs are primarily used for shallow water drilling of natural gas in the US Gulf of Mexico (GoM).

While shares have recovered  almost $1 of value since their recent lows based primarily on an initiating coverage report from Wells Fargo, Seahawk will likely continue to see headwinds in shallow water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in the near/mid-term or until they are able to increase utilization (via higher demand for shallow-water gas drilling and/or an end to the deep-water moratorium) and/or execute possible asset sales.  As I see it (as does Wells Fargo's analyst), these moves would help steer the company through these tough times to an eventual return to profit.

As I have been watching shares fall, I have been reading other pieces by value investors around the blogosphere arguing the value of the rigs based on scrap value or scrap + rig equipment to basically say, here is the floor for the shares because their equipment is worth more than this.  In addition to the rig value, HAWK also has over $3.50/share of NET CASH (as of last reported 10Q).

Despite the valuation argument, a number of factors have been weighing on shares for the past several months:

1. Uncertainty about the GoM after the BP disaster - Although this has effected all companies in the oil&gas drilling business that have operations in the GoM, HAWK already carried a fair amount of uncertainty due to the large number of rigs they have cold stacked, the age of their rigs and their quarterly cash burn...all problems that are largely derived from the decline in utilization since 2008, when the GoM was running on all cylinders with oil & gas at record highs.  While the moratorium on drilling does not effect shallow water drilling (all of Seahawk's rigs are shallow water), the resulting fallout and confusion within the BOEM has made it extremely slow to nearly impossible to get permits even for shallow water drilling, according to CEO, Randall Stiley.
2.Quarterly cash burn has been running high, with no real end in sight given HAWK has only one of their rigs contracted past the end of October (Seahawk 3000) and even then, it's not certain as to when it will begin work given the fair amount of repairs to be done to make it ready for operation (HAWK draws credit line for repairs).

3. HAWK's shallow water day rates have not recovered and I'm not going to pretend to be an expert on all the reasons for this, but this is due to a number of things such as GoM rig overcapacity, the aforementioned moratorium, the age of HAWK's rigs as well as the abundance of gas reserves and drilling that is now going on onshore due to fracking the enormous finds of the barnett, haynesville, etc shale fields.

4. HAWK currently has a complicated tax issue with the Mexican authorities, a remnant of their time as a part of Pride International.  The headline number for this liability is a whopping $229MM, which dwarfs the Company's cash on hand and would be burdensome even if they managed to sell several of their rigs with liberal valuation applied.  However, the news may not be as bad it seems due to a tax sharing agreement between Pride and HAWK.  For a more fulsome explanation of this situation from a tax lawyer that certainly understands the situation better than I, see this article...

I have stated these risks as a forewarning that there is some chance that if management cannot contract HAWK's rigs at a higher rate, sell certain assets and/or figure out a way to diversify the rig base by purchasing assets outside the GoM that would be immediately accretive to earnings and cash flow, there is further downside risk to shares.

However, at these levels, I believe it may be time to at least dip the toes in the name as the downside protection is notably more significant than it was just a few months ago when shares were trading at $10-12.  I'm probably going to get some disagreement here despite the fact that mr. market seems to have proven this out, but I don't think HAWK's rigs are worth as much others think they are under the current scenario and I think they are worth even less in a liquidation scenario.  While you can point to scrap value or equipment value as a floor valuation, there are much better places to get scrap steel than melting down a rig and there are much better places to get equipment than spending money to buy a rig for the equipment or pay to tear it off a rig.

$7-9MM may be a good fire-sale comp amount under a more normalized scenario, but we are far from normal right now and also talking about rigs that are either cold stacked and require repairs to get working and at very least we're talking about very old rigs with low desirability across the portfolio....I was told by one industry expert "there just aren't a lot of people that want their rigs in this environment"...so, for conservatism sake, let's halve those numbers:








So, even at the low end of our conservative valuation, shares look to have upside potential of 23%!  In another way of putting it, the market is valuing HAWK's rigs at a little less than $2.5MM per rig if the company were never to earn another dollar and ceased to operate.  For comps, Hercules Offshore recently managed to sell 2 of its retired rigs, the Hercules 191 and Hercules 255, for $5MM each.  Although the sale was negotiated at the end of 2009 when the 2010 economic outlook was notably more rosy than has played out today, the 191 sale is still notable because of the transaction closed in 2Q10 and was for a retired rig that had been cold-stacked for about 9 years and has a shallower depth capability than all but one of HAWK's rigs (the Seahawk 800).

So, as far as rigs go, it is pretty clear that HAWK's, even in a dire scenario are likely being grossly undervalued, a fact that should give comfort for downside protection.  A second fact is that, despite not having a solid backlog going through the rest of the year after October, HAWK does have several rigs that are currently operating.  Additionally, backlog for shallow water drills tends to be relatively short in nature and not necessarily planned many months or years in advance, so there is still decent likelihood that HAWK could get contracts for the remainder of the year lined up.
*Chart sourced from HAWK management presentations


Now with greater clarity on downside risks and protection via discounted rig valuation, let's look at a few further upside potential points:

1. Mexico's state owned oil company, PEMEX, recently announced an expanded budget for 2011 as well as a $1Bn loan from the U.S Imp-Exp Bank to be used primarily for shallow water drilling.  Although it is unlikely HAWK will benefit from this spending directly due to PEMEX's reticence of using the mat jackup rigs that HAWK has, any shallow water contracts with other operators could take some of the competing capacity out of the US GoM by moving it to Mexico, which should help HAWK in the event of a drilling revival in the US GoM.  Fair warning is that PEMEX is notoriously corrupt, inefficient and difficult to work with, so a lot of this spending may not come to fruition, but they have at least received a loan and indicated a desire to spend on production, which is a positive and will be even more so if it actually goes through in the next year.

2. HAWK has massive positive leverage in the event that they can survive this storm and return utilization to +50% and day rates improve to some degree.  The below chart, provided by HAWK, details incremental EBITDA improvement given a starting point of average day rates of $40K with operating expenses of $26K.














With 16-18 rigs contracted back in 2008, HAWK was able to generate $300MM in EBITDA for the year.  Assuming that the Company could even maintain half as many jackups with lower rates, HAWK could at least return to positive EBITDA and slow cash burn.  Above this, operating leverage is significant.

3. Gulf certainty and/or a lift in the moratorium, either early or even by the current November 30 deadline, would be a big positive for HAWK and the drilling industry.  If not lifted early, I believe shares might begin to run up in anticipation of the end of the ban and if lifted earlier than expected, you could see a substantial (albeit likely brief) pop in the shares as that load on their shoulders is at least lightened if not completely lifted.

Overall, at these levels, I believe that HAWK has a relatively attractive profile based on its discount asset valuation, cash on hand (albeit burning) and the eventual lift of the GoM moratorium.  If management can make moves to shore up their cash burn through moves like asset sales or an acquisition of immediately accretive assets outside the GoM, I believe the thesis could play out faster.

Disclosure: Author is long shares of HAWK


Saturday, September 11, 2010

TZOO: Still more upside from daily deals

As many of you know, there is a phenomenon known as Groupon that has been sweeping the nation and is now moving into other countries as well.  For those unfamiliar, what Groupon does is negotiate one really great deal in your city each day at a huge discount (normally 30-90% off) and send it to you in a nice morning e-mail.  These deals may be for local restaurants, spas, or fun activities.  Along with Groupon, which is in over 100 cities, there have been many copycat services like LivingSocial, BuyWithMe, etc.  (Shameless plug: a couple of friends run a great site called Yipit.com that aggregates all of these daily deals in several cities and sends you ones based on preference of the types of deals you like, go sign up)

The business model is not too difficult to set up as long as you have some tech savvy to create a website and can devote the time of at least one person to pound the pavement and find businesses that want to do the deals.  The businesses win because they get new customers they may not have otherwise gotten, the Groupons of the world win, because they get a cut: 50% of the face value of the coupon.  That's right, 50% for negotiating the deal and posting it on a website.

I'm simplifying it quite a bit, but the bottom line is that it takes very few bodies to get the deals negotiated and the margins are HUGE.  Past paying people to find deals and keeping the lights on, the cost structure is not very burdensome and you can make a ton of money, which is why recently, Groupon raised a round of venture capital that placed a $1.35Bn valuation on the company (see techcrunch.com/2010/04/18/its-official-groupon-announces-that-1-35-billion-valuation-round/)...that's right, BILLION.  According to stats, Groupon reaches around 18 million people via their daily e-mail. and has over 100 deals running a day.

As I said, the low barriers to entry have brought a lot of entrants into this space and now a few publicly traded companies have gotten into the peddling of daily deals as a new revenue source and to reach additional customers that may use the site for other reasons once they are there.  Travelzoo (TZOO), OpenTable (OPEN), and The Knot.com (KNOT) are the notable entrants that have launched in several cities.  While they have only been in this business line for a month or so, their results have already proven very compelling and the stock prices of TZOO and OPEN have subsequently shot up, with BofA-ML recently upgrading OPEN based primarily on their daily deal revenue that will be coming in.

While I think OpenTable has a great business and I use the site frequently, their valuation and reach makes them less compelling to me than Travelzoo, which already has a daily e-mail that reaches +21 million people around the world on a daily basis to hoc travel deals.  The TZOO daily deal is different though...instead of a flight or a hotel that is available for several weeks or months for a discount rate, the daily deal is a one day, huge savings coupon for a specific restaurant, spa, activity, etc. deal.  They currently offer the daily deal in 6 cities (SF, LA, Houston, Chicago, Minneapolis, and Des Moines(!?)) and have done well with the deals they have offered so far, selling several hundred in each city.

Here is why I think it's a game changer for them and why you, as an investor can take advantage of information that is new enough that I don't think most of Wall St. fully understands just how big this could be.  Below are the stats for recent deals on TZOO.  As you can see, there are several deals in a couple of the cities and one deal in a few of the newer markets.  For conservatism sake, I have assumed that TZOO has not gotten as good of a revenue share deal as Groupon and only gave them 30% credit for the face value of the deals, but as you can see, the revenue is material to a company that is this small when you consider they will potentially do lots of these deals each quarter going forward...and they haven't even launched in NYC, Miami, Philly, Dallas, etc.  If they can make this much in a market like Des Moines, imagine what they could do in larger 2nd tier markets like Cleveland, Tampa or San Antonio for instance.

Example Deals
Des Moines Deals Bought Deal Value Total $ Sold TZOO Revenue*
Deal 1 125 $10 $1,250
Deal 2 107 $10 $1,070
Deal 3 65 $14 $910
Deal 4 25 $10 $250
Deal 5 48 $15 $720
Deal 6 717 $20 $14,340
Deal 7 358 $25 $8,950
Deal 8 196 $10 $1,960
DM TOTAL $29,450 $8,835
Chicago
Deal 1 419 $50 $20,950
Deal 2 970 $59 $57,230
CHI TOTAL $78,180 $23,454
Minneapolis
Deal 1 500 $40 $20,000
Deal 2 1,326 $10 $13,260
Deal 3 1,217 $39 $47,463
Deal 4 1,055 $10 $10,550
MINNY TOTAL $91,273 $27,382
Houston 112 $59 $6,608
LA 472 $89 $42,008
SF 99 $25 $2,475
OTHER TOTAL $51,091 $15,327
TOTAL $74,998
 *Assumes TZOO makes 30% of deal face value

Assuming TZOO does not roll out to any additional cities for the remainder of this quarter and giving them credit for this amount of revenue for ONLY 20 DAYS a quarter (this is a rough approximation, but fair for conservatism in my mind), TZOO could earn an additional ~$1.5MM in revenue per quarter (~5.5% growth over what they earned in Q2), but the best part is the margin on this revenue should be extremely high going forward as it takes so little manpower compared to the rest of their business to get these deals negotiated.

As an added bonus, given that TZOO already has a sales team that is focused on getting local travel, entertainment and hotel deals for their main service, ramping up this service in other cities should be relatively easy...heck, Groupon is launching in about 1 new city a week at this point.  Going forward, TZOO will roll out to more cities domestically with more deals.  International is an enormous opportunity as well, with many Western European cities just recently getting on the daily deal bandwagon.  If only a few deals and a few cities can grow revenue this significantly, imagine what could happen in coming quarters when they have 10-20 cities and more deals running simultaneously.  That 40x P/E multiple they currently sport could drop to a meager 15-20x when the E grows.

Disclosure: No position at this time, but evaluating a long in shares of TZOO